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I. INTRODUCTION

Establishing democracies in nations traditionally ruled by
dictators is a long and arduous process. Such is the tragic story
of Latin America. Over the years, many leaders in Central and
South America have tried to institute the fundamental individual freedoms and governmental restraints that constitute democracy.1 Yet, most have failed under the weight of economic disorder, social unrest, and ultimately, coups d'etat.2
Argentina is a country where only a decade ago the military
controlled the operation of the state and, in many respects, the
thinking of the people.3 Argentina's shift to free and open elections in 1983, however, marked the beginning of a profound

1. See generally GUILLERMO O'DONNELL, MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATICAUTHORITARIANISM: STUDIES IN SOUTH AMERICAN POLITICS (1973) (giving examples of
attempts to create democracy in eight different Latin American nations); Don
Podesta, S. American Democracy Takes Hold Even as Rulers Try to Stay On, WASH.
POST, Jan. 1, 1994, at A20.
2. Salvador Allende, the Chilean president who was overthrown and killed by
General Augusto Pinochet's military coup in 1973, is just one of the many examples
of Latin American leaders who failed to bring democracy to their respective countries. See Podesta, supra note 1, at A20. The reasons for the economic, social, and
political problems that have overcome much of Latin America is beyond the scope of
this paper. For different views of this problem, see generally STANLEY J. STEIN &
BARBARA H. STEIN, THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LATIN AMERICA (1970) (discussing
the theory of economic dependency on Europe and the United States); POLITICAL
CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Larry Diamond ed., 1993)
(discussing the role of popular political culture in the development of democracy and
economic progress); O'DONNELL, supra note 1 (discussing the bureaucratic-authoritarianism model of political institutions).
3. See Marcelo Cavarozzi, Political Cycles in Argentina since 1955, in TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE 21 (Guillermo O'Donnell et al. eds., 1986) (discussing the government's "shock treatment" of violence and repression used to condition Argentine society after 1966).
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transition to democracy.4 As the nation's history has demonstrated, this transition is a highly fragile process. 5 Argentine
leaders must not only reform political institutions. They must
also rethink their roles within those institutions. These leaders
must prove to a skeptical society that the years of extra-constitutional political abuses have passed. Only then will Argentina's
population truly embrace democracy.6
In recent months, Argentina's transition has entered a crucial stage. Argentine political leaders, behind the impetus of
President Carlos Menem, have called for the revision of the
nation's 140-year-old constitution. 7 At stake is a realistic opportunity to solidify and legitimize democratic principles and to
foster economic stabilization and growth. If successful,
Argentina will serve as a powerful example for many other Latin
American nations. To achieve such results, the Argentine
leaders must place national interests above personal motives.
Ironically, the personal agenda most dangerous to the success of
democratic reform is also the one which has led the drive for
constitutional change in Argentina: President Menem's desire to
assure his own re-election.
Part II of this Comment discusses Menem's re-election initiative and the coalition that has made constitutional reform a
possibility. Part III provides the basis for understanding why
reform is necessary at this time by analyzing the history of the
Argentine Constitution and its centralist origins. Part IV examines the institutional problem of hyper-presidentialism' in
Argentina. It posits that a presidential re-election provision-without commensurate authority-limiting constitutional

4. See Irwin P. Stotzky, The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 105, 105-06, 109, 113 (1989).
5. Id. at 113-14.
6. Former Argentine President Raul Alfonsin provides a good working definition of the type of democracy which he hopes his nation will become. See Raul R.
Alfonsin, The Function of Judicial Power During the Transition, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDIciARY 41-42 (Irwin P. Stotzky
ed., 1993). According to Alfonsin, the requirements of democracy include, among

others: (i) respect for political liberalism and human rights; (ii) incorporation of republican principles of representation, political opposition, and separation of powers
into the workings of government; and (iii) deference to the rule of clear and universal laws. Id. See generally President Raul R. Alfonsin, Building Democracy, 12 YALE
J. INT'L L. 121, 123-24 (1987).
7. See infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 110-117 and accompanying text.
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amendments-may intensify Argentina's present anti-democratic
predicament. The final two sections of this Comment explore the
actual process of constitutional reform and democratic consolidation. Part V studies how and why past attempts at constitutional reform have led to crisis situations. Part VI argues that
coalition-building can strengthen the legitimacy of the Argentine
political system.
Although this Comment focuses on Argentina, the lessons to
be learned here are applicable to all of Latin America.
Argentina's leaders will, ideally, set a democratic precedent for
the rest of the continent.
II. THE RE-ELECTION INITIATIVE
A. Menem's Intentions and Article 77
President Menem has been firm about his intention to run
for re-election in 1995. He told Radio Amdrica, for example, the
week before the October 3, 1993 congressional elections, "[wie
have gone far in four years ... [but] I need ten years to consolidate the reforms we have introduced."9 Menem's desire for reelection only strengthened after his party's success in those
congressional elections.' ° Menem and his Peronist Party"
supporters saw the positive results of the October election as
evidence of the popular approval of their administration. 2 As
Menem told reporters on election night, "[ilt would be hypocritical if I said that after tonight's victory my desire to be re-elected
has not increased." 3

9. Argentine President Says He Needs Another Term, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File.
10. See William R. Long, Argentine Ruling Party on Roll After Elections, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at A4 (noting Menem's desire to run for re-election).
11. The official name of the party is the Justicialist Party. President Juan
Per6n founded the coalition in 1949, and his followers still comprise much of its
voting members. This paper will use the Peronist Party, the more commonly used
name of Per6n's Party.
12. See Menem Claims Ample Victory in Key Argentine Poll, REUTERS, Oct. 3,
1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File; see also Menem Wants a
Second Term, ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 1993, at 47 (explaining the election served not
only as an indicator of the Peronists' popular edge over the Radicals, but also as an
indicator of Menem's popularity compared with rival Peronist presidential hopefuls,
such as Senators Antonio Cafiero and Jos6 Octavio Bord6n).
13. Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentine Ruling Party Wins, Fueling President's Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at A3.
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Menem's ambition to serve another term in the Casa
Rosada (the Argentine executive office) will require more, however, than a solid campaign and a strong approval rating. Article
77 of the Argentine Constitution prohibits the re-election of an
incumbent president.14 Should Menem abide by the Constitution, he would not be eligible to take office again until the year
2001, when he would be seventy-one years old.15 But Menem is
not a complacent individual.16 One prominent businessman in
Buenos Aires said of the President, "[hie is a rainmaker, the
most astute politician in Argentina, possibly in Latin
America." 17 On

the issue

of his

own

re-election,

"rainmaker" has created a constitutional storm.

this

B. The Unlikely Coalition
Before November 1993, only Menem believed that the
Peronists could garner the congressional support necessary to
abolish Article 77.18 The Peronists needed to secure the votes of
two-thirds of both legislative houses to call for the convention
required to amend the Constitution. 19 In November 1993, the
Peronists had the thirty-three votes they needed in the Senate,
but they lacked this requisite majority in the 257-seat Chamber
of Deputies.20
14.

ARG. CONST. art. 77. "The President and Vice President hold their offices

for a term of six years; and they may not be re-elected except after an interval of
one term." Id., translated in Fortuna Calvo Roth, Argentina, in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 15 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz, eds.,
1983).

15. See Peter Bate, Argentines Vote in Election Key to Menem's Plans, REUTERS,
Oct. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File. The next presidential election will be held in 1995.
16. See Argentine President Says He Needs Another Term, supra note 9
(reporting Menem characteristically told reporters that "in politics you don't win if
you don't run any risks").
17. Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentine Leader Gains Support to Change Constitution
to Allow for 2d Term, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A5.
18. See Carl Honore, Menem, Archrival Alfonsin Embrace, Agree on Reforms,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 1993, at A25.
19. ARG. CONST. art. 30. "The Constitution may be amended entirely or in any
of its parts. The necessity of amendment must be declared by the Congress by a
vote of at least two thirds of the members; but it shall not be effected except by a
convention called for the purpose," translated in Roth, supra note 14, at 7; see also
Como funciona la convencion constituyente, CLARN, Nov. 28, 1993, at 8-9 (Arg.).
20. See Long, supra note 10, at A4 (reporting that the Peronists picked up nine
seats in the Chamber of Deputies in the October 3 elections, falling just two seats
short of a majority. The opposition Radical Party, in contrast, lost a seat.).
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Despite this lack of support in the Chamber of Deputies, the
President has all but buried Article 77. Jubilant supporters have
already posted banners trumpeting "Menem 1995" along the
boulevards of Buenos Aries. 21 This sudden change of fortune,
permiting Menem supporters to celebrate, has come from the
most implausible source. On December 13, 1993, former Radical
President Raul Alfonsin, Menem's archrival, signed an agreement which promised Menem the votes he needed in the lower
house.2 2 Nine days later, the Chamber of Deputies passed legislation calling for the creation of a constitutional assembly with
an overwhelming majority.23
The Peronists' prospects of forming a consensus with the
Uni6n Civica Radical (the UCR or Radical Party) seemed ludicrous a short time ago.24 Many Radical members saw Menem's
plan for re-election as a self-serving initiative driven by personal
greed for power and disrespect for democracy. 25 Alfonsin, who

21. Honore, supra note 18, at A25.
22. Argentine Lower House Approves Constitutional Reform, UPI, Dec. 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File. The formal Peronist-Radical
compact- which the press has labeled the "Olivos Pact," after the city where the
executive residence is located-came a month after Menem and Alfonsin had initially
come to mutual terms. The Radical party officially voted to support the agreement
on December 3, 1993. Id.
23. The final vote was 188 to 53. Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentine Senate Backs
Menem on Second Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at A5. The bill did not pass the
Chamber without friction: it took 30 hours of debate and a fistfight between two
congressmen. Id. The following week, the Senate passed the same bill more peacefully by a 38 to 7 margin. Id.
24. UCR Announces End of Co-operation; Campaign Against Menem's 'Authoritarian Excesses', LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Oct. 8, 1992, at 11, available in LEXIS,
NSAMER Library, ARGEN File. Initially, Peronists and Radicals had come to the
negotiating table a number of times to discuss possible constitutional reform. Former
Radical President Raul Alfonsin stated in October 1992 that the time for cooperating
had come to an end. He did this after Menem's Minister of the Interior tried to
deny the Radicals a seat legally won in the Senate by claiming that the vote never
took place and then calling a new election. Id.; see also Menem Starts to Get Political Again; Electoral Deals for 1991 & Accord with UCR on Reforms, LATIN AM.
WKLY. REP., July 19, 1990, at 2, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File
(listing several points of reform that the Peronists and Radicals shared).
25. See Setback for Menem's Re-election Drive; Departing Minister Accuses Campaigners of Dirty Tricks, LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP., Sept. 9, 1993, at 6, available in
LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File [hereinafter Setback] (stating that the Radical leaders were threatening to issue to the Argentine population a statement that
the Menem Administration was "on the verge of breaking the legitimacy of the constitutional process"); see also Andrbs Wolberg-Stok, Row Over Menem's Reelection Bid
Breaks into Open, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library,
ARGEN File; Don Podesta, Argentine Vote May Become Referendum: Menem Asks
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spearheaded this critical group, had to relinquish his power to a
gloating Menem six months before the end of his presidential
term in 1989, due to Argentina's severe economic crisis.26 Since
that time, Alfonsfn has likened President Menem to Adolf Hitler
and former Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner
Alfonsin's circle was not the only group that questioned the
motives behind Menem's re-election campaign. The Argentine
press strongly opposed the Peronist plan.28 Many respected journalists linked the President's re-election campaign with a
desire to cover up corruption within his administration. 29 As
the influential Catholic magazine Criterio stated, the force
behind Menem's desire to remain in office was his "need to perpetuate a group in power so that the acts of corruption were not
investigated." °
The Menem administration has systematically repudiated
any involvement in such illicit activities. Yet, recent physical
assaults and anonymous death threats against members of the
press have created an air of disbelief in the President's
denials."1 An Argentine film crew recorded one of the press'

Mandate to Seek Reelection, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at A19 (reporting that "Menem is seen by some as hungry for power for its own sake, a throwback to the
tradition of strongman rule, rooted in the history of both Argentina and the party
founded by Juan Per6n").
26. See Honore, supra note 18, at A25 (stating that Alfonsin called his fellow
party members to "head the opposition to [Menem's] re-election").
27. Id. Alfredo Stroessner was the former military leader who ruled Paraguay
from 1954 to 1989. While considered a master of the political process, Stroessner
consolidated much of his power through controlling his opposition, sometimes to the
extent of "systematic harassment." CARLOS R. MIRANDA, THE STROESSNER ERA 2
(1990). In fact, Stroessner had "one of the worst human rights violation records in
Latin America." Id.
28. See William R. Long, Threats, Assaults Complicate Argentine Journalists'
Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1993, at A3.
29. Id. Reported scandals include charges against Menem's private secretary,
Miguel Angel Vicco, for selling contaminated milk to government social assistance
projects; handing out $80 million in bribes to government officials during the
privatization of Aeroltneas Argentinas; and circumventing the alien nationalization
process for Menem's distant drug-smuggling cousin from Syria. Horacio Verbitsky,
Argentina Retreats from Democracy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1992, at A23. Verbitsky
claims that Menem discharged several top prosecutors assigned to investigate these
and other charges of corruption against the government and "replaced them in some
cases with officials who had been targets of their investigations." Id. Re-election
might allow tactics like this to continue. Id.
30. Church: Why Re-Election?, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Sept. 9, 1993, at 6, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File.
31. See Carl Honore, Assaults on Argentine Journalists Rise as Vote Nears,
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assailants embracing Menem at a public ceremony.32 Another
journalist reported that while being beaten, his assailant
warned him to stop writing that the President was hiring henchmen to silence the press.33 Seemingly hard evidence of
Menem's disrespect for freedom of the press has forced many in
the media to unite against him and his government.34
Verbal attacks have also come from within Menem's own
camp. One of the worst setbacks to President Menem's constitutional reform initiative came when his Interior Minister,
Gustavo Beliz, resigned after only nine months in office.35
Beliz's resignation was controversial because many observers
considered him to be one of the President's closest and most
trusted advisors. 3' Additionally, Menem recruited Beliz for his
Cabinet position after the previous Interior Minister resigned
amidst corruption charges.37 Beliz had the reputation of "Mr.
Clean,"38 an untarnished young civil servant with close ties to

the Catholic Church.
It is the manner in which Beliz resigned, not the loss of a
Cabinet member, which hurt Menem's credibility most. 9 Beliz

MIAMI HERALD, Sept., 23, 1993, at A6.
32. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Reporters Facing Peril in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 1993, at A7.
33. Id.; see also Leon Patricios, Case Comment, Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich The
Argentine Supreme Court Limits Freedom of the Press with a Self-Executing Right of
Reply, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 541, 544 (1993). Menem, of course, has denied involvement in the assaults. See Long, supra note 28, at A3. The President
blamed the attacks on unidentified "beasts who don't deserve to live in civilized
society." In the same breath he commented that such attacks "go with the job" of
being a journalist. Id.
34. Nash, supra note 32, at A7. Juan Carlos Camano, leader of the press workers union, has headed the press' opposition to Menem. He demanded, at a rally in
mid-September 1993, that the government punish those individuals responsible for
the violence. Id. Menem commented on the press' antagonism towards his administration: "What's going on with the media, which have turned into the main opposition to the government?" Long, supra note 28, at A3.
35. See Setback, supra note 25.
36. Id.
37. Menem 'Disciple" Quits, Focuses Criticism on Re-Election Efforts, LATIN AM.
INFO. LETTER, Sept. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File
[hereinafter Menem "Disciple"Quits].
38. Id.
39. See generally Wolberg-Stok, supra note 25. Belize had allegedly made several enemies within the Menem camp, who the local media blamed for organizing a
violent attack on reporters in August 1993. The media speculated that Beliz's foes
staged this and other incidents to discredit Beliz as incompetent at his ministerial
post. Id.
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left office verbally criticizing the tactics of the "ultra-Menemists"
who worked to
give their leader an opportunity for re-election
"at any cost."40 He claimed that Menem and his cronies were
engaging in anti-democratic practices that were quickly "generating an unacceptable state of suspicion. "
Finally, Beliz
warned that such tactics would "not only frustrate the possibility
of reform but also generate a crisis of unpredictable consequences."4 2
C. Change of Position
At the time of Beliz's resignation, Alfonsin heralded the
departure as a true indication of the Peronists' political indiscretion.4 3 Not all Radicals, however, shared the former
President's dogmatic view. Many members favored cutting a deal
with Menem." Alfonsin's quick shift to this latter camp have
caused political observers to question his motives.
The press has described the former President's new position
as a method of "damage control."45 Such a label seems to
characterize appropriately the repairs Alfonsin and the Radicals
must make to their party. The Radicals desperately need to

40. Menem "Disciple" Quits, supra note 37. One of the main targets of Beliz's
attack was Eduardo Bauza, the General Secretary of the Presidency. Beliz also mentioned that several loyal Peronists, such as Ram6n Ortega, the Governor of TucumAn, and Domingo Cavallo, the Minister of Finance, supported his view. Id. These
allegations are unsubstantiated.
41. See Setback, supra note 25 (citing an article in the newspaper Clartn which
quoted Beliz as saying that some of the most loyal Presidential aides were prepared
to buy the votes they needed to secure the two-thirds support in both houses of
Congress).
42. Id. Menem dismissed these charges by saying that, "[elveryone has the
right to speak. Beliz did so, and now everything will continue as before." Marcela
Valente, Government Downplays Minister's Denunciation, IPS, Aug. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File.
43. See Valente, supra note 42 (quoting Alfonsin as saying that Beliz "did a
service for the country in unmasking the electoral motives behind this alleged constitutional reform").
44. See Menem Wants a Second Term, supra note 12, at 47. Governor Eduardo
Angeloz is one of the most cordial Radicals to Menem's plans. Angeloz changed the
provision of C6rdoba's Constitution to allow for his own re-election. Peronist Landslide Lends Supports to Menem Reelection, LATIN AMER. INFO. SERV., Oct. 15, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File. Before the Menem-Alfonsin
compact, Angeloz seemed to be one of the front-runners to face a Peronist presidential candidate in 1995. Id. He still may be.
45. Honore, supra note 18, at A25.
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secure popular support.4 6 The UCR has faltered in the polls
since it relinquished power in 1989, winning only thirty percent
of the national vote in the October 1993 congressional elections,
and only nineteen percent in the April 1994 elections for representatives to the Constitutional Convention.4 7
The Radical Party's need to repair its internal break-down,
however, is even more important than minimizing the damage to
its public image.' The Radical party is sharply divided over
the issues of re-election and the economy. 49 One side consists of
those members who followed Alfonsin's message of opposition to
Menem and his programs.5" The other side consists of those
who have lauded President Menem for his economic programs
and have, as a consequence, remained silent, even tolerant, of
Menem's re-election bid.5 1
The Peronists targeted this moderate Radical group when
Menem announced after the October 3, 1993 elections that the
government would hold a national plebiscite on the issue of
constitutional reform.5 2 The referendum would be non-binding

46. Id.
47. Long, supra note 10, at A4; Results from Constituent Assembly Elections,
NOTIsuR, Apr. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File.
Among the party's most symbolic and visible losses, in both elections, was in the
traditional Radical stronghold of Buenos Aires. Id.
48. See Honore, supra note 18, at A25.
49. See id.
50. See Peronists Win Diluted Victory in Reelection Vote, LATIN AMER. INFO.
SERV., Apr. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File. Many of
the Radical leaders who followed Alfonsin during his verbal battle against Menem,
now lead that opposition in Alfonsin's absence. In the April 10, 1994 elections to
select representatives to the Constitutional Convention, these Radicals refused to
participate in the campaign. Id.
51. See Menem Wants a Second Term, supra note 12, at 47. The debate over
Menem's re-election often returns to the issue of the economy. Even Menem's critics
recognize the dramatic economic reforms that this administration has implemented,
especially in the area of deregulating industry and curbing inflation. See William R.
Long, Argentine Ruling Party on Roll After Victory, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1993, at A4.
Inflation had reached 196% per month in 1989; today the inflation rate has stabilized at approximately 1% per month. Id. Menem's successes in this area cannot be
understated; however, whether his ability to transform the economy allows Menem
the right to demand another term as President is highly problematic. As much of
this Comment will discuss, the methods and tactics that Menem has utilized to pass
his economic program may be considered highly undemocratic. See Verbitsky, supra
note 29, at A23.
52. See Long, supra note 10, at A4 (reporting that a plebiscite would place
pressure on the Radicals).
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on the Congress.5 3 But, it would serve as a powerful weapon for
the Peronist Party, which planned to use a favorable response to
coerce "middle-of-the-road" opposition legislators and to divide
further the Radical Party.54 It is not surprising that Alfonsin
signed the agreement with Menem on the condition that the
Peronists suspend the referendum initiative.55
Some observers have also stated that Alfonsin had personal
motives for his sudden reversal of opinion. One reporter writes,
"[h]is about-face has a hint of farce, almost as if Ross Perot had
suddenly thrown his support behind NAFTA." 6 Alfonsin had
been out of the news for quite some time, as President Menem
dominated the headlines in Argentina and abroad.5 7 The pact
with Menem finally returned Alfonsin to a position of some influence and power.5"
But even the most sceptical observers of Alfonsin's motives
doubt that ego was the sole driving force behind his desire to
negotiate with the enemy.5 9 Alfonsin and his supporters have
preached the necessity of constitutional change since 1983.60
Thus, the former President may simply view his pact with the
Peronists as the first and only realistic opportunity he has to
pass part of the reform package his administration initiated a
decade ago.61
53. Id.
54. See Honore, supra note 18, at A25. President Menem announced that the
government would conduct a national referendum on November 21, 1993, only a
week before Menem and Alfonsin reached the agreement. "A defeat in the constitutional reform plebiscite . . . would have ruined Radical moral. And widespread support for reform could have pushed some Radical congressmen to lend their votes to
the Peronists." Id.
55. Id. Menem stated that he would have recalled the use of plebiscite should
the Radicals have backed out of the agreement. Peter Bate, Argentina's Menem
Leaves Door Open to Plebiscite, REUTERS, Nov. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS,
NSAMER Library, ARGEN File.
56. Honore, supra note 18, at A25.
57. See High Note of Optimism Rings in a New Year of Continuing Reform,
LATIN AMER. INFO. SERV., Jan. 7, 1994, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library,
ARGEN File. Many news stories have focused on Menem's economic reforms and
industrial privatization program. See Long, supra note 51, at A4. In January, the
Organization of American States awarded Menem the Leadership-94 Pan-American
prize for the implementation of his economic reforms. Alexander Trushin, Argentina's
PresidentAwarded by OAS for Economic Reforms, TASS, Jan. 12, 1994, available in
LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File.
58. Honore, supra note 18, at A25.
59. See id.
60. See generally Alfonsin, Building Democracy, supra note 6, at 129.
61. See Nash, supra note 17, at A5 (reporting that "[tihe Radicals, who are in
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After the October 3, 1993 elections and the announcement of
a national referendum which never occurred, Menem's party
stood in a dominant negotiating position relative to the Radicals.
Alfonsin felt enormous pressure to meet Menem at the bargaining table.6 2 In addition to the threat of a plebiscite and further
divisions within his party, the Radical leader feared that the
President might grow impatient and decide to drive his reelection package through Congress without the UCR's formal
approval. 3 For instance, the Peronists had advanced the argument that only two-thirds of the congressional members present
in the voting chambers, not two-thirds of all members of Congress, would be needed to call for a Constitutional Assembly.'
In short, the possibility that Menem would call a surprise
session of Congress to pass his proposal without opposition was
quite real.6 5
D. The Menem-Alfonsin Agreement
Speaking on behalf of his Peronist Party, President Menem
expressed his willingness to concede some issues to the Radicals
in exchange for Alfonsin's support of his re-election amendment. 6 Creation of a coordinating ministerial position, analogous to a prime minister, was one important concession provided
in the bi-partisan agreement. The coordinating minister would
be in charge of the government's daily operations. 7 The

a very weak position, see this as an opportunity to get more checks and balances on
the executive").
62. See generally Long, supra note 28,- at A3.
63. See Honore, supra note 18, at A25 (reporting that the Peronists may have
been tempted to call a surprise session of Congress).
64. Id. The integrity of this interpretation of the Constitution, however, was
suspect even among some of Menem's own party members, such as Jos6 Octavio
Bord6n and Antonio Cafiero who, in August, called for the establishment of a coalition to legitimately pass the bill. See Argentina Postpones Constitutional Reform
Debate, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN
File.
65. See generally Honore, supra note 18, at A25. Under Article 86, clause 12,
the President can call the Congress to session "when some grave interest of order or
process requires it." ARG. CONST. art. 86, § 12.
66. See Long, supra note 10, at A4.
67. Main Points of Radical-JusticialistReform Accord Reported, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library,
ALLNSA File [hereinafter Main Points]; Texto Completo del Documento, LA NACI6N,
Nov. 15, 1993, at 12 (Arg.). The Radicals first proposed the idea of establishing a
quasi-parliamentary system of government in 1983 under a report published by the
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President would be responsible for appointing this official. However, the minister would be directly responsible to Congress,
which would have the authority to remove him by a majority
vote of censure. The coordinating minister would, in short,
assume some of the powers presently afforded the President.'
A second major concession the two leaders reached was the
reduction of the presidential term from six to four years.6 9
While President Menem announced his acquiescence to the
shorter mandate more than a year ago, he had never definitively
agreed to such a provision.7 ° For many in Alfonsin's circle, this
proposal had pragmatic appeal. Most Radicals were uncertain
about their ability to win the Casa Rosada in 1995, due to their
faltering public support. But no Radical politician wanted to risk
waiting until the next presidential election in 2001 to regain
control. 7 '
Third, the compromise contained provisions limiting the
President's authority to declare executive decrees on issues of a
legislative nature, including penal law, taxes, and electoral and
political party law issues. 2 In the area of federal intervention,
that such
the agreement reaffirmed the constitutional provision
73
power was vested in Congress, not the President.
These provisions are significant. They address opponents'
claims that Menem has used executive decrees and federal intervention abusively over the past four years to advance the policies of his administration.7 4

Council for the Consolidation of Democracy. See Alfonsin, Building Democracy, supra
note 6, at 129.
68. In addition to having control over the actual administration of the government, the new ministerial position would, in theory, assume direct authority over
the military. See Carlos S. Nino, The Debate Over Constitutional Reform in
Democracy in Latin America, 16 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 635, 647 (1992-93).
69. See Main Points, supra note 67.
70. Jurists of the Justicialist Party, Contents of the Reformation of the National
Constitution 37, June 2, 1992 (providing for a four year term limitation). President
Menem never officially endorsed this document.
71. See Long, supra note 10, at A4. Alberto Kohan, the Secretary General of
the Peronist Party told reporters that the Radicals "knew they would lose in 1995
no matter which Peronist candidate they ran against, and if Menem was not allowed
to run, he would be back in the next election and they'd lose that as well ....

So

the thinking was better to let Menem have this time in office now and start preparing a credible Radical candidate for 1999." Nash, supra note 17, at A5.
72. See Main Points, supra note 67.
73. Id.; see also ARG. CONST. art. 86, § 19.
74. See Verbitsky, supra note 29, at A23.
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Fourth, the compact provided for a Council of Magistrates to
administer the federal judicial branch.75 The Council would be
responsible for submitting lists of possible nominees for federal
courts and the Supreme Court.7 6 The President would nominate the judges, with final Senate approval by an absolute majority of all its members."
The Menem-Alfonsin pact also contained provisions for
removing the requirement that the President be a member of
the Roman Catholic Church and a plan for revamping the electoral college system." Under the proposed agreement, the President would be elected by direct popular vote," as would be the
provincial Senators to the federal government. 0 Additionally,
the City of Buenos Aires, presently governed by a presidential
appointee, would have a freely-elected mayor.8 '
Members of the Constitutional Convention, elected April 10,
1994,2 will be under strong pressure to ratify the proposed
changes in their entirety.83 Legally, however, the assembly is
not bound to adopt the Menem-Alfonsfn compact. In fact, the
assembly can adopt any constitution they wish.' That fact
frightens many observers who believe that certain interest
groups, including the ultra-left and the military, may exert their
influence to gain specific constitutional provisions. 5
75. See Main Points, supra note 67.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.; see also Bate, supra note 55.
80. Alfonsin Makes Unexpected U-Turn: Talks and Agreement with Menem of
Reform of Charter, LATIN AMER. REGIONAL REP., Dec. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS,
NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File [hereinafter Alfonsin Makes Unexpected U-Turn].
Each province will receive one extra senator, to have a total of three. Id.
81. Id.
82. Peronists Win Diluted Victory, supra note 50; see also Results from Constituent Assembly Elections, supra note 47. The Peronists won 37.7% of the vote, and the
Radicals 19.2%. Although the two parties will comprise a solid majority of the assembly, neither party showed as strongly as their leaders had hoped. Id. Some political analysts read the election results as public disapproval of Alfonsin's leading
role in the Radical Party and of the on-going corruption scandals in the Menem
Administration. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Menem Gains in Bid for New Term in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1994, at A5.
83. See Nash, supra note 23, at A5. The assembly will meet in June 1994, to
begin deliberations on the new Constitution. The delegates must finish within 90
days, or else call a new convention. See Results from Constituent Assembly Election,
supra note 47.
84. Id.
85. See Edgardo Buscaglia, Jr., It's Too Soon to Alter Argentina's Constitution,
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Additionally, while the compact passed a formal vote of the
UCR on December 3, 1993,86 there are still many sceptical
party members. Radical Congressman Rafael Pascual, for
example, told reporters soon after the pact was announced,
"[tihis is not a historic agreement, as some would have it. It's a
pact between two political leaders to expedite the only thing that
matters to the President-his re-election.""7 Similarly, Radical
Senator Fernando de la Rua stated, after casting his negative
vote for the bill, that the proposed changes constituted merely
"reform for the ruling class that wants to stay in power. " '
Pascual and de la Rua's less enthusiastic positions may garner
support before the convention meets this summer. A reputable
group of opponents to the Menem-Alfonsin compromise could
jeopardize its adoption and disrupt the entire Constitutional
Convention. 9
III. CENTRALIZATION OF POWER UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1853

Like many other Latin American charters,90 the Argentine

Constitution of 1853 fosters the present condition of executive
dominance in the federal government.9 It is this imbalance of

CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Dec. 27, 1993, at 18. These groups did, in fact, have a strong

showing in the election for representatives to the Constitutional Convention. See
Results from Constituent Assembly Election, supra note 47. The Frente Grande (Broad
Front), which represents renegade Peronists, Communists, and Liberals, won 13% of
the vote; while the rightist Movimiento por la Dignidad y la Independencia (Modin),
lead by former army rebel Aldo Rico, won 9.1% of the vote. Id. Although not in a
position to challenge seriously Menem's re-election initiative, these two groups will
be able to broker concessions and agreements from the Peronist-Radical coalition. Id.
Out of 305 members to the Convention, the Frente Grande and Modin have 32 and
18 delegates respectively. The Peronists and Radicals have 139 and 74 delegates
respectively. Id.
86. Alfonstn Makes Unexpected U-Turn, supra note 80. The Radical Party
passed the pact's provisions by a vote of 196 to 87 after 11 hours of debate and
another fistfight. See Nash, supra note 23, at A5.
87. Bate, supra note 15.
88. Nash, supra note 23, at A5.
89. See Buscaglia, supra note 85, at 18.
90. See Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States
and Its Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 1,
27 (1990); see generally D. VALAD]S, LA DICTADURA CONSTITUTIONAL EN AMERICA
LATINA (1974).

91. See Nino, supra note 68, at 640. "Argentine hyper-presidentialism is partly
the result of Argentine constitutional provisions designed by Juan Bautista Alberdi,
the intellectual father of the Argentine Constitution." Id. The Constitution of 1853 is
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power which the Menem-Alfonsin compromise is intended to
ameliorate. To better understand the magnitude of this project,
it is important to appreciate the constitutional origin and evolution of the current executive authority.
A. History of a Centralist Constitution
Present day executive dominance in Argentina, as in the
rest of Latin America, directly results from the nation's Iberian
heritage and centralist political culture.9 2 The 300-year-old dictatorial tradition that Latin American revolutionaries tried to
overcome in the first half of the nineteenth century proved to be
more resilient than the military forces of the Spanish Crown and
the ruling Government of the Indies.93 The leaders inability to
transform political theory into reality was one reason for their
failure.94
While the military leaders of the independence movements
in South America espoused the liberal, egalitarian ideals of the
United States and France, their visions were overly idealistic. 95
Their dreams of Athenian democracies had the power to motivate populations in the years of revolt against the Crown, but
they lacked the pragmatic appeal necessary for the post-revolu-

the document in force today in Argentina.
92. See Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in
Argentina: Partial Failure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3
(1993). "A long-lasting colonial legacy of centralism and absolutism had nurtured a
heavily authoritarian political culture." Id.; see also POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOC-

RACY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 297 (Larry Diamond ed. 1993) (arguing that Latin
American culture is inherently presidentialist).
93.

See CLAUDIO VELIZ, THE CENTRALIST TRADITION OF LATIN AMERICA 11 (-

1980) "The consolidation and institutionalization of the imperial hold was accompanied by the emergence of a centralist, civilian, bureaucratic, and legalistic style of
politics from which neither the imperial Indies nor the independent republics of
Latin America have ever departed with much conviction or success." Id.
94. See id. at 148.
95. Id. at 148-49. Some scholars question just how liberal these revolutionaries
really were in discussion of the leaders' motives for declaring independence from
Spain. See Rosenn, supra note 90, at 21. The leaders of the independence movements, loyal to the Iberian aristocracy, would not obey the mandates of a French commoner (Napoleon's brother Joseph) on the Spanish throne. Id. In this respect, independence from the Crown became a "conservative goal, a means of upholding traditional values and social codes." Id. In 1814, when Ferdinand VII returned to Spain,
the Creole class of Latin America could not accept the King's sanctioning of the
liberal Napoleonic Constitution. Id.
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96

tionary period of reconstruction.
The new nations of Latin America needed structure and
political certainty. Unlike the United States, where established
provincial legislatures existed long before the Revolution, Latin
America had no such pre-existing system. 97 The consequence of
the Latin American revolutions was a political vacuum-a vacuum, first, created by the severing of Iberian ties and,
subsequently, heightened by social unrest.9" When faced with
the problem of establishing order admidst upheavals, therefore,
the Spanish bureaucrats and letrados (university trained civil
servants) took effective control. These men resorted to recreating
the "centralist arrangements they knew how to handle and for
which no adequate substitute was found." 99
Lack of a better known alternative, however, was not the
sole reason for the formation of a centralist government in the
early years of Latin American independence. Just as important
was the desire of the post-independence local strongmen, the
caudillos, to consolidate their own political, economic, and social
hegemony.' 0 0 In Argentina in particular, armed conflicts
among the powerful caudillos over the expansion of their territories and personal power ravaged the countryside in the first
half of the nineteenth century.' Battles ensued between the
"federalist" strongmen of the inland provinces, who desired a
nation of semi-autonomous states, and the centralist-thinking
"unitary" leaders of the littoral province of Buenos Aires. The
"unitary" leaders ultimately won by mid-century. 1 2 In order to

96. VELIZ, supra note 93, at 149.
97. Id. at 148.
98. See id. at 148-49.
99. Id. at 150. "Behind them [the military leaders] repairing the damage and
reconstructing the familiar shapes and institutions came the Sancho Panzas of Latin
America, the Creole bureaucrats and letrados, heirs to centuries of dominance in the
Government of the Indies." Id. at 149. Speaking of the constitutions adopted in the
newly formed Latin American nations, Rosenn writes: "On the one hand, they reflect
the liberal, democratic tradition consciously imported from France and the United
States. On the other hand, they also reflect the authoritarian, corporatist, and elitist
tradition inherited from Spain and Portugal." Rosenn, supra note 90, at 24.
100. See Rosenn, supra note 90, at 21-22. The wars of independence did not
result in true revolution because the means to wealth-namely land holdings and
export facilities-never changed hands. As a consequence, the highly stratified social
structure which existed prior to independence endured the change of government. Id.
101. See generally DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1982, at 79-80 (1985).
102. See id. at 118-20. The supremacy of the Unitarian movement came with the
fall of Federalist dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas and his followers, which did not
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join a nation torn by decades of civil strife, these new leaders
supported a strong president living in the city of Buenos Aires
and-as a concession to the federalists-directly limited in
power. That limitation10 3 largely rested upon the prohibition
against self-succession.

B. PresidentialPower Under the Argentine Constitution
Both the political theories and governmental realities of the
post-independence era were integrated into Argentina's Constitution. As a result, the Argentine Constitution, while based
largely upon the United States Constitution, has strikingly different provisions on presidential power.10 4
Constitutionally-mandated privileges give the Argentine
President broad powers over and independence from the other
two branches of government.0 5 For instance, the President
may appoint members of the Cabinet without Senate advice or
consent, and may remove administrative officers from their
posts.' O6 Notably, this latter power includes dismissal of
to investigate corruption charges
special prosecutors appointed
07
against the government.

Further, the Argentine President can use the veto power to
cut individual provisions from a bill, virtually re-writing legislation.' O8 The President can also interfere with the Congres-

occur until the early 1860's. See id. By that time, "the country ceased to be a segmented imbroglio of caudillo chieftainships, and it gradually surmounted its interregional conflicts to form a nation state that gained undisputed authority throughout
the republic." Id. at 118.
103. See id. at 124. "Admittedly, the powers of the executive branch could have
been more carefully constrained in the 1853 Constitution of Argentina, but it is clear
that the framers of that document intended to put a strong presidency in place."
Garro, supra note 92, at 93 (citing Harry Kantor, Efforts Made by Various Latin
American Countries to Limit the Power of the President, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN
LATIN AMERICAN POLirIcs 21 (Thomas V. Di Bacco ed., 1977)).
104. See Rosenn, supra note 90, at 24, 27.
105. See Garro, supra note 92, at 85-86.
106. ARG. CONST. art. 86, § 10.
107. See Verbitsky, supra note 29, at A23. During the course of his term,
Menem removed the Attorney General, several government prosecutors, and officers
of the court of government accounts. Nino, supra note 68, at 641. Critics questioned
the motivation for the President's actions, accusing Menem with trying to cover-up
corruption charges. See Verbitsky, supra note 29, at A23.
108. ARG. CONST. art. 72 (providing for a bill to be vetoed in whole or in part
by the president).
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sional process that approves budgets and investments. 10 9
The most significant of the President's superlegislative
powers are those to declare a state of siege and to execute
decrees. In a state of siege, the President may suspend basic
human rights, including freedom of speech and freedom of the
The power to execute decretos reglamentarios
press."
(regulating decrees) allows the President to implement and
enforce the laws of Congress in any manner the President deems
appropriate."'
IV. INCREASING THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

Most opponents of Menem's original reform package-one
which did not contain specific provisions redirecting presidential
authority to the other branches of government-fear a further
concentration of presidential power.1 2 In fact, some fierce
critics have characterized Menem's desire to be re-elected under
" 113
his original reform package as a "quest for absolute power.
While this concern may exaggerate the situation, there is no
doubt that the measures Menem wants to implement would
increase his own strength by allowing him four to six more years
to solidify his personal hold over the government and the

population."'
A. Hyper-Presidentialism
President Menem is the current heir to a deep institutional
problem in Argentina, which legal historian and political advisor
Carlos Nino labeled "hyper-presidentialism.""' In this condi-

109. ARG. CONST. art. 86, § 13.
110. See Nino, supra note 68, at 640 n.24. Cf. ARG. CONST. art. 86, § 19.
111. ARG. CONST. art. 86, § 2. It is this latter power that the former President
Juan Per6n used so often to circumvent the will of Congress between 1946 and
1955. See Roth, supra note 14, at xli. Menem has apparently inherited the habit
from his party's founder.
112. See Nash, supra note 17, at A5.
113. Verbitsky, supra note 29, at A23.
114. A second term would mean that Menem would remain in office longer than
any twentieth century Argentine leader, including Juan Per6n. Per6n served nine
years in office between 1946 and 1955, when a military coup forced him to leave the
country. Per6n returned to Argentina and the presidency in 1973, but died in office
several months later. See generally ROCK, supra note 101, at 360-66.
115. See Nino, supra note 68, at 640-41 (discussing Menem's enlargement of
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tion, a balance of power among the different branches of the
government is almost nonexistent." 6 Even local governmental
sovereignty from the President is minimal." 7 The executive
branch is, in effect, the government on both a federal and
national level.
1. Federal Dominance
Democracy cannot develop adequately under a powerful
executive branch without the counter-balance of a popularly
elected congress, capable of formulating laws, and an independent judiciary, able to interpret and apply them. 1 8 To guard
against executive dominance, Argentina needs a system of government founded upon the checks and balances that a tri-partite
system of government imposes." 9 In order for these checks
who respect
and balances to work, Argentina needs politicians
120
branches.
the
among
power
of
this division
During the first four years of his term, President Menem
has successfully avoided many of the presidential limitations
which the Argentine Framers adopted. Menem's court packing
plan was a highly controversial example. In 1990, Menem
increased the number of Justices to nine by adding four new
Justices with strong loyalties to the President.' 2' According to
one reporter, Menem "sneaked this measure through the Congress one night by using busboys and clerks to fill the seats for a
power). "Apart from the case of Mexico, the current system in Argentina is possibly
the most extreme form of presidentialism in the world, placing it in line with semiauthoritarian systems." Id. at 643.
116. Id. at 641 ("Hyper-presidentialism . . . results from the practice of successive executives who enlarge their powers at the expense of a resigned Congress, and
with the blessing of the Supreme Court.").
117. See id.
118. Id. at 642; see also Garro, supra note 92, at 86 (citing Robert J. Kolesar,
North American Constitutionalism and Spanish America: "A Special Lock Ordered by
Catalogue, Which Arrived With the Wrong Instructions and No Keys?", in AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIoNALIsM ABROAD 41, 52-55 (George A. Billias ed., 1989)). As Garro notes,
this problem is not only found in Argentina, but rather, is endemic to all of Latin
America. Id.
119. See Rosenn, supra note 90, at 11-12. The structure of a federalist system
and the balance of powers between the states and the central government, as in the
United States, is also a major component an effective democracy. Id. at 11.
120. Id. at 4 (noting, "[plerhaps the best evidence of the success of constitutionalism in the United States is that constitutional precepts are widely respected and
obeyed").
121. See Verbitsky, supra note 29, at A23.
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'quorum."" 2 2 Menem successfully circumvented the
legislature's check on the President's nominating authority, and
secured for himself the obedience of the judiciconcurrently
23
1
ary.
The situation on the Supreme Court has since changed.
Three Justices resigned in late November and early December of
1993."2 The Justices resigned after Alfonsin demanded a
realignment of the Court before he and the Radicals would back
Menem's re-election package. 125 These events represented a
strong exercise of power on the part of Alfonsin to force his will.
However, the power that Menem wielded over the judiciary was
no less than absolute. In short, Menem demostrated his ability
to create new positions on the Court and to force resignations of
presumably independent Justices holding life-tenured posi126
tions.
Menem has also demonstrated enormous presidential power
with his liberal use of executive declarations. While these
decrees are designed to implement and enforce the laws of Congress, the Supreme Court has upheld the President's authority
to legislate through "decrees of necessity and urgency."12' The
problem is that the President defines what constitutes "necessity
and urgency. 12 1 In the first two years of his term, Menem
issued over one-hundred such decrees-a substantial number
compared with his predecessor's eight decrees in five and one-

122. Id.
123. See Garro, supra note 92, at 101; see also Patricios, supra note 33, at 544
(commenting on the correlation between the goals of the President and the Supreme
Court since Menem took office).
124. See Andr~s Wolberg-Stok, Two More Argentine Supreme Court Members Step
Down, REUTERS, Dec. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File.
125. Id.; see also Alfonsin Makes Unexpected U-Turn, supra note 80. Two of
these resignations came only hours before the Radical Party convened in La Pampa
Province to vote on the Menem-Alfonsin pact. See Wolberg-Stok, supra, note 124.
126. See Alfonsin Makes Unexpected U-Turn, supra note 80, (reporting that it
was Menem who put pressure on the justices to resign). For an argument that the
use of presidential power over a supreme court is justified after a shift of government regimes, see Owen M. Fiss, The Limits of Judicial Independence, U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 57, 67-70 (1993) (arguing, however, that Menem's interference
with the Court occurred after a regular shift in administrations, not regimes).
127. See Cura Grassi, Divisidn de poderes y la emergencia, REVISTA JURIDICA
ARGENTINA-LA LEY [L.L.], Jan. 15, 1992; I.J.M. Cullen, Asuncidn de facultades legislativas por el presidente (Decretos de necesidad y urgencia), (1992-A] L.L. 839; Carattini, Reflexiones sobre el caso "Peralta",L.L., Sept. 29, 1992.
128. See Garro, supra note 92, at 82-83.
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29

half years. 1

Menem has proven his willingness to circumvent the democratic processes of his government and the constitutional limitations imposed upon the power of the presidency. 3 ° He is a
master at increasing his own power at the expense of the other
government branches. During his first four years in office, President Menem cunningly, but effectively, neutralized the other two
branches by packing the Supreme Court and overriding Congress with executive decrees. 1 ' The Radicals' proposed amendments to reform the Constitution will, if properly utilized,
realign the balance of power in the federal government by taking
Casa Rosada and
some of this presidential authority out of the
32
placing it into Congress and the judiciary.
2. National Dominance
Argentine presidents have traditionally demonstrated their
authority over the provincial governments through the process of
federal intervention. The Argentine Constitution states that,
"[tihe federal government may intervene in the territory of the
provinces in order to guarantee a republican form of government ...." Therefore, when Congress is not in session and
the Argentine President believes that a province's government is
in danger, or if the provincial leader invites the President to
take action, the President may replace the local authorities with
(trustees) to return the region to "constitutional
interventores
,' 134
order.
Over the years, Presidents have broadly interpreted Article
6--especially the phrase "to guarantee a republican form of
government"-to consolidate their own power and that of the

129. See Nino, supra note 68, at 641. Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo
defended the use of executive decrees by stating that the President implemented
them in almost all cases to "eliminate regulations, restrictions, preferential treatment, bad taxes and other distortions created by decree-laws" of the military governments. Menem "Disciple" Quits, supra note 37.
130. See Stotzky, supra note 4, at 124.
131. Garro, supra note 92, at 101.
132. See generally Main Points, supra note 67.
133. ARG CONST. art 6, translated by Garro, supra note 92, at 87 n.285
(emphasis added).
134. See Garro, supra note 92, at 87-88.
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federal government.' 35 Menem has maintained this tradition.
In the first four years in office,136 he has replaced six provincial
governments with trusteeships.

Critics of the Menem administration have warned that the
President's use of federal intervention is dangerous. Political
and legal historian Alejandro Garro wrote that the ideas of pluralism and separation of power inherent in democratic institutions "have been and continue to be seriously threatened in
Argentina by the abuse of the power of federal intervention in
the provinces. " 13 ' The President's ability to intervene so freely

in the otherwise autonomous functioning of the states
purpose of a federalist system:
undermines the 3 fundamental
8
decentralization.

Alfonsin has tried to secure an agreement from Menem to
keep the power of federal intervention solely in the hands of the
Congress.3 9 Whether this is a promise Menem will respect, or
one that the Constitutional Convention will adopt remains
uncertain. However, it is a crucial step towards ameliorating a
present imbalance of federal control over the provinces.
B. Disrespectfor the Rule of Law
Menem's past actions raise the question of whether he and
his advisors respect the rule of law. Corruption charges and
physical attacks on the press comprise only the more obvious
abuses of presidential power. Menem's determination to rule by
executive decree, instead of through legislative procedures, and
to impinge on provincial sovereignty demonstrates the
President's propensity for 40 exploiting the weaknesses in the
Argentine political system.

135. Id. at 87 n.285.
136. Id. at 89 (citing as an example: LEGISLACION ARGENTINA, No. 460, Aug.
1992, at 5 (decreeing the federal intervention of the judicial branch of the Province
of Corrientes)). Garro notes that Corrientes is the only province in which the
Peronist Party has never won. Id. at 89 n.291.
137. Id. at 87.
138.

Id.; see also DANIEL PONEMAN, ARGENTINA: DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 15 (1987)

(stating that the right of intervention "combined with a centralized tax system . . .
has impeded the diffusion of economic and political power to the provinces").
139. See Honore, supra note 18, at A25.
140. The idea that the rule of law should guide a nation exposes a profound
ideological separation. On one side are those "instrumentalists" who feel that the law
incorporates the rules by which leaders can achieve particular ends. On the other
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Respect for the rule of law serves three essential purposes
in a democratic system: (i) to provide a state of order, (ii) to
assure a government by law rather than by force or power, and
(iii) to impose substantive restrictions on the legislative power of
political leaders.' 4 1 Respect for legal authorities forces leaders
to abide by principles of regularity and restraint. 142 That is,
they apply and enforce the same procedural and substantive
laws for all parties, including themselves and their governments.
When leaders fail to observe an objective standard of
accountability for their actions-which the legal authority of a
constitution should
provide-their rule can easily become arbit143
rary and abusive.
The standard to which Menem holds himself accountable is
apparently based upon a subjective conception of the limitation
to his presidential authority. Menem legitimizes his methods by
pointing to his results.'"
Supporters of the Menem administration would argue that
there has been no abuse of power and that Menem has acted
only in the best interests of the nation. 41 This argument is

side are the "substantivists" who believe that law has as its primary objective the
realization of a social contract based on liberty and justice. Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 192 (1989).
141. David Feldman, Democracy, The Rule of Law & Judicial Review, 19 FED. L.
REv. 1, 11 (1990) (Austl.).
142. Stotzky, supra note 4, at 108 n.13.
The rule of law is a major foundation of democratic political systems. It
is a call to political justice and has remained, over the centuries, a
vibrant ideal of democratic society. The central core of this principle
embodies the enduring values of regularity and restraint---of treating like
cases alike and inhibiting the arbitrary actions of government officials.
Id.
143. Symposium, Transition to Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 965, 1019 (1990). This has often been the problem in Latin
America during military rule. The seemingly lack of accountability of military governments to the rule of law has lead to many reported human rights violations in
Argentina and other Latin American nations. Id. Other civilian presidents, such as
Fujimori of Peru, have used the military for seemingly autocratic purposes. See Podesta, supra note 1. Amid cries of dictatorial measures, Fujimori shut down the Peruvian Congress in April 1992, as he called a state of national emergency. Id.
144. See No me molesta gobernar por decreto, LA NACION, July 8, 1992, at 7
(Arg.) (interview with President Menem). "President Menem is bound to rely, to a
greater extent than his predecessor, on his personal charisma in the implementation
of undemocratic patterns of presidential hegemony used to push through policies by
executive decree." Garro, supra note 92, at 98.
145. See Menem "Disciple" Quits, supra note 37. Minister Cavallo stated that
nearly all Menem's executive decrees were implemented to "eliminate regulations,

1993-94]

ARGENTINA: RE-ELECTION 1995

307

supported by the remarkable economic transformation which
Menem and his Finance Minister, Domingo Cavallo, have created in Argentina over the past two years. Credit must be given
for these economic accomplishments. However, one must be
careful not to view accomplishments from an "ends-justifying"
perspective. 146 "[SIuch economic transformation cannot and
should not be achieved at the cost of altering the balance of
powers guaranteed by the Constitution, the main purpose of
efficiency but to preclude the
which is not to promote economic
1 47
exercise of arbitrary power."
Permitting Menem to amend the Constitution to allow for
his own re-election does not necessarily mean that his abuse of
power will continue, nor does it necessarily mean that Menem
will be re-elected. What it does mean is that future Presidents
will face a situation where their personal desire to win a second
term could compel them to utilize their extreme power over the
federal and provincial governments to advance their interests.
Menem has not only demonstrated the existing latitude of this
power. He has also succeeded in implementing and broadening
it.
Moreover, if the Radicals do not participate in drafting the
new Constitution, and if they do not demand that limitations be
placed on the President's authority, the broad powers that
Menem has historically used will continue to threaten
Argentina's democracy. Should the coalition break down, Menem
might be able to force the Constitutional Assembly to pass his
re-election amendment alone by including certain "pork barrel"
provisions to please the fringe groups. Such a superficial alteration of the Constitution would mark a further deterioration of
congressional and judicial checks on the executive branch's
power. Additionally, it would demonstrate to future
leaders-civilian or military, in Argentina and abroad-that
they could alter the federal constitution to serve the personal
agenda of the President.

restrictions, preferential treatment, bad taxes, and other distortions created by decree-laws" of the past military regimes. Id.
146. Garro, supra note 92, at 83.
147. Id.
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V. EXCLUSIONARY POLITICS

Redistribution of governmental power is essential for the
future of democracy in Argentina. Just as important, however, is
the political process by which such reform is achieved.'" Many
of Menem's alleged constitutional abuses have been procedural
abuses. In the past, Menem has enacted laws benefitting the
nation, especially its economy; but he has done so by circumventing formal democratic process.149 Evading proper procedure to exclude the opposition from possibly blocking the
Peronists' agenda has been both Menem's purpose and
result.5 °
In Argentina, the process of amending or reforming the
federal Constitution has historically resulted in the exclusion of
opposition groups.15 ' This possibly is due to the perceived

importance of the Constitution as a legitimizing instrument and,
therefore, as a vehicle for maintaining power. 2 The conflicts
resulting from the political exclusion during these precarious
times of change divide society and impede political discourse. 153

148. See Podesta, supra note 1 (stating that Menem's present desire to use constitutional means to remain in power "marks a sharp turn away from Latin
America's history of coups d'etat and rule by force").
149. See Garro, supra note 92, at 83. "In a country where programs for the
control of inflation and deregulation of the economy are so urgently expected to
succeed, hardly anybody cares whether those programs were devised by means which
were constitutionally shaky." Id.
150. See Menem 'Disciple Quits, supra note 37 (justifying national interests); No
me molesta gobernar por decreto, supra note 144 (discussing the purpose and import-

ance of decrees).
151. See Nino, supra note 68, at 639. One reason for this ubiquitous precedent
of exclusion is that many constitutional changes have occurred after coups d'etat. See
Rosenn, supra note 90, at 8. Between 1930 and 1990, there have been 139 extraconstitutional changes of government in Latin American; approximately seven in
each nation. Id.
152. Constitutions provide the foundation for ordinary laws as they root those
laws in the formal objectives and values of a society. A.S. Caldera, The Rule of Law
in the Nicaraguan Revolution, 12 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 345 (1990). Where
many Latin American leaders have failed was by assuming that their rise to power
gave these leaders the right to impose such objectives and values on society.
153. See Buscaglia, supra note 85, at 18 (reporting that Menem believes he can
realize his re-election initiative without producing the dangerous polarization which
has frequently resulted in Argentine constitutional conventions).
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A. HistoricalPrecedents of Exclusion in Argentina
Argentine leaders have often excluded their opponents from
political participation during the process of drafting or reforming
the federal Constitution. The Unitarian-created Constitution of
1826, for example, excluded the Federalist leaders from participation.' Provisions in the new charter-including a nine-year
presidential term and placement of the national capital in
Buenos Aires-seriously affronted the Federalists caudillos of
the interior provinces.' 55 The Federalist revolted only six
months after Bernardino Rivadavia, the Unitarian founder of
that document, began his term. They demanded that Rivadavia
resign and forced his successor to nullify the Constitution.'56
Some of the most violent and contentious fighting between these
two factions occurred in the following years, over the structure
that the government was to take, culminating in the quasi-dictatorship of the Federalist Juan Manuel de Rosas.'57
In 1949, Juan Per6n drastically amended the Constitution of
1853 through the use of executive decrees.' 58 Per6n's Constitution allowed for his own re-election to the presidency by means
of direct election. It included provisions that increased the power
of the executive office over the provinces and federal government.'59 The new charter also gave the President wide discretion in declaring a "state of internal war," and in expropriating
private property. 160 Per6n unsuccessfully attempted to use
these self-declared
powers against his adversaries to scare and
6
1
them.1
subdue
154. See ROCK, supra note 101, at 101 (describing how the Federalists resisted
the Unitarian constitution, which contained provisions for a nine-year presidential
term and for the president to have the power to appoint and dismiss provincial
governors).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 103.
157. Id. at 103-04. Exclusion from the formation of government in this period
had profound economic ramifications. The Unitary leaders generally represented the
mercantile interests of Buenos Aires, while the Federalists were associated with the
powerful cattle groups. Id. At stake were limited funds and much needed military
support. Id. at 102.
158. Id. at 288; see also Nino, supra note 68, at 639; Carlos Nino, Transition to
Democracy, Corporatism and ConstitutionalReform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 129, 162 (1989).
159. See ROCK, supra note 101, at 336.
160. Id.
161. See GARY W. WYNIA, THE POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 254-
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The military opposition of 1949, with the support of liberaldemocrats, rural and industrial entrepreneurs, and the Catholic
Church responded to Per6n's actions by overthrowing him in
1955. The opposition annulled the Peronist Constitution and
excluded the Peronists from participating in the Constitutional
Convention.' 62 The custom of dealing with political opponents
by silencing them helped create a culture of anti-governmental
movements which plagued Argentina in the decades that followed."6 3
B. "Zero-Sum" Politics
The use of exclusionary measures throughout Argentina's
history is largely due to the population's cultural perception of
political norms." Argentine leaders traditionally view politics
as a "zero-sum" game,16 5 whereby a benefit to one group signifies an automatic detriment to all others.166 Distaste for compromise is particularly relevant to the present question of constitutional change. Menem's opponents, and even many of his supporters, urge that, "[a] constitution ... must be the result of
broad consensus; it must be seen as a constitution for all
Argentines, not as the constitution for a particular party."6 7
In a society which perceives one party's gain as the other party's
loss, finding mutually advantageous solutions is not often considered. "Power-sharing is not part of this concept and consensus
is achieved, not by compromise between competing groups, but
by the elimination of competition."'6 8 Failure to negotiate within the political institutional structure forces opposition groups

55 (1990).
162. See ROCK, supra note 101, at 336. The Constitution that the military
leaders adopted was the original 1853 charter.
163. See generally id. at 346-66 (discussing the popular uprisings of the 1966-76
era in Argentina).
164. See SUSAN CALVERT & PETER CALVERT, ARGENTINA: POLITICAL CULTURE AND
INSTABILITY 149 (1989). This phenomenon is true for all Latin American nations. See
id. at 150.
165. Id. at 149.
166. This harsh attitude arises from many elements, including: (i) the importance of machismo as a male character trait; (ii) the. role of personalism in political
followings; and (iii) the unwillingness to compromise with opponents. Id. (noting that
"Argentina is a society that considers compromise a questionable trait of human
character").
167. Nino, supra note 68, at 639.
168. CALVERT & CALVERT, supra note 164, at 149.
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outside the structure. Such foreclosure occurred in 1826 when
Rivadavia refused to compromise with the Federalist leaders, in
1949 when Per6n expelled his opponents from government, and
in many other instances throughout Argentina's history." 9 The
possibility that the present situation could result in the same
condition remains real.
C. Threat of Suppression of Debate
The Peronists and the Radicals entered into negotiations
supporting widely different agendas for the reformation of the
federal Constitution. Most of Menem's party supported a
minimalist stance on the issue of constitutional reform. 170 The
Radicals, on the other hand, have traditionally promoted a complete revision of the existing Constitution, including transformpresidential system into a mixed parliamening the Argentine
7
tary system.' '

Ideological differences are not harmful; they may even
stimulate democracy as long as political discussion remains
open. However, until mid-November 1993, Menem's re-election
drive had the opposite, deleterious effect of reducing debate over
constitutional reform. 72 Some fault must be placed upon the
Radicals for initially refusing to negotiate with a re-electionminded President. Yet, at no time did Menem suggest that he
ambitions for the sake of politiwas willing to curb his 1political
73
cal and social cohesion.

The Radicals feel that Menem should learn from the position Alfonsin and his advisors took during their term in office.
At that time, the Alfonsin administration also hinted at the

169. The 1970s, in particular, saw many anti-government extremist groups use
protests and violence as political weapons. The Montoneros was one such group. See
ROCK, supra note 101, at 353-55.
170. See Garro, supra note 92, at 638 (noting that the central constitutional
issue for Menem is re-election).
171.

REFORMA CONSTITUTIONAL: SEGUNDO DICTAMEN DEL CONSEJO PARA LA CONS.

OLIDAC16N DE LA DEMOCRACIA 11-13 (1987). Former President Alfonsin formed the
Council for the Consolidation of Democracy in 1983 upon assuming office. The main
responsibility of this organization was to propose solutions to the problem of legitimizing democracy in an Argentina badly scarred by almost forty years of military
rule, civil strife, and economic and moral decay. See Garro, supra note '92, at 93
n.301.
172. See Nino, supra note 68, at 638.
173. Id. at 638-39.
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possibility of re-election, although Alfonsin himself publicly
rejected such intentions.' 7 4 In the end, Alfonsin's Council for
the Consolidation of Democracy tactfully excluded all mention of
re-election in its public reports, furthering political debate and
avoiding political confrontations on the issue. As Carlos Nino,
the Coordinator of the Council, wrote, "avoiding the issue of
modification of the prohibition on re-election permitted the
debate175to focus upon issues of great institutional importance."
By overcoming their opposition to Menem's re-election proposal and finally negotiating with the Peronists, the Radicals
have taken a monumental step forward to break Argentina's
tradition of political noncooperation. 176 Menem also deserves
praise for opening negotiations with his long-time rivals. As
Argentina prepares for a new national charter, President
Menem must allow the Radicals to continue playing a large role
in this fragile process. Conversely, Alfonsin's party must use this
occasion to foster an attitude of compromise and cooperation. 177 At stake is a crucial opportunity to increase the population's confidence in its leaders and government.

VI. BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Whether Menem's bid to reform the Constitution is fueled
by personal ambition or by a solemn desire to allow the
Argentine people greater freedom of political expression is highly
debatable. 71 More certain is the observation that Argentina

174. See Garro, supra note 92, at 92.
175. See Nino, supra note 68, at 638.
176. For example, it would have been easy to follow the route that the Peronists
took in 1955, when the military excluded that group from government participation.
The Peronists essentially withdrew altogether from the political process by implementing a strategy of passive resistance; the Peronist representatives cast all blank
ballots. See ROCK, supra note 101, at 336.
177. See Cavarozzi, supra note 3, at 48 (noting the importance of seeking "positive resolution[s] of conflicts and negotiations

...

"

between the Radicals and the

Peronists).
178. Menem to Press Ahead with Constitutional Reform, REUTERS, Aug. 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ARGEN File. Menem has characterized his
proposed constitutional amendment as allowing the population to vote for whomever
they desire without the restraint of eliminating the incumbent president from their
choice. He said, "[tihe Constitution must be reformed with the consensus of the
people, not the (political) parties." Id.; see also Argentine Senators Blocking Menem's
Reform Drive, REUTERS, Sept. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library,
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stands to gain from the Menem-Alfonsin compromise.'7 9
Compromise is essential to create political cohesion in democratic systems.8 0 Through negotiations and concessions,
Argentine leaders have a chance to usher in a new, "reformed"
government created by a constitutional revision representing the
vast majority of the Argentine population. Unfortunately,
Argentina's history and Menem's record do not demonstrate a
propensity for reaching ends that have been legitimized by political compromise.'
A. Lack of PoliticalLegitimacy in Argentina
Legitimacy is arguably the single most important factor to
the existence of any democracy. Yet, it is the factor most commonly absent in Latin American nations.8 2 Much of this problem is rooted not in the malfunctioning of the political institutions themselves. Rather, it is rooted in the leader's continuous
circumvention of constitutional processes. The population, as a
result, has developed a profound mistrust of the rule of law's
effectiveness, and a suspicion of their leaders."8 3
This lack of legitimacy led to crisis in 1973, when Juan
Per6n returned to power and placed his second wife, Isabel, in

ARGEN File.
179. See Cavarozzi, supra note 3, at 46-48. See generally JUAN J. LINZ, THE
BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES CRISIS, BREAKDOWN, & REEQUILIBRATION 66
(1978).
180. See LINZ, supra note 179, at 75.
181. See Cavarozzi, supra note 3, at 47.
182. LINZ, supra note 179, at 18. Linz defines a legitimate government as one
considered by the political leaders and the general populace as the "least evil of the
forms of government" at that time and place. "Ultimately, democratic legitimacy is
based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular historical juncture no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective
goals." Id.
183. See Stotzky, supra note 4, at 108 (referring to A. HUTCHINSON & P.
MONAHAN, THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEALOGY (1987)). "In general, Latin
Americans have not internalized the importance and legitimacy of a constitutional
system based upon the rule of law." Id. Some analysts have noted that the strength
of the Frente Grande and Modin parties' showing in the recent elections for the
Constitutional Assembly demonstrated the public's concern that the present government address issues of corruption within the Administration. See Peter Bate,
Menem's Armor Dented in Argentine Charter Vote, REUTERS Apr. 14, 1994, available
in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File. The Frente Grande, which garnered 13%
of the vote in that election, ran expressly on an anti-corruption platform. Id.
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the vice-presidency. 8 4 When Per6n died, Isabel succeeded him
amid violent outcries of nepotism and incompetence. Argentina
might have avoided the turmoil accompanying and following
Isabel's two-year rule had "Per6n.. . been more concerned with
building institutional integrity and continuity rather than with
personally selecting his successor." 8 5
A more recent legitimacy crisis erupted in the early 1980s.
Military leaders at that time, faced with impending economic
collapse and intra-government dissention, turned to foreign
8
affairs to try to raise public morale and confidence. ' The
ensuing defeat in the Falklands War proved to be the military's
most costly failure. 187 The generals realized that even the force
of arms could not restore the people's belief that military rule
was legitimate.'8
History supports the proposition that reforming constitutions in Latin America is only one of the steps necessary to consolidate democracy.' 8 9 Equally, the people and leaders must
make a moral and intellectual commitment to democratic ideals
and self-sacrifice. 90 A population must believe that problems
can be solved by resorting to legal practices, and supporters
must have the conviction to stand up to non-believers. The
coalition between President Menem and Radical leader Alfonsin
may signify a shift to such a commitment.
B. The Role of Coalitions in Building Legitimacy
The formation of political coalitions strengthens institutional legitimacy in two ways. First, through political compromise and cooperation, leaders are able to legislate through the
proper democratic procedures. In this way, coalitions usually
ensure effective majority rule and realization of common objectives, rather than resulting in political gridlock or imposition of
a strong minority.
The people's belief in the legitimacy of their government is

184. Stotzky, supra note 4, at 116-17.
185. Id. at 117.
186. See ROCK, supra note 101, at 374.

187. Id. at 376.
188. Id. at 374-76.
189. See, e.g., Stotzky, supra note 4, at 119-20.

190. Id.
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Leaders who are
based largely upon their leaders' efficacy.'
unable to find solutions to national problems, or are simply
unable to implement those solutions, lose the faith of the population. 192 When people perceive an administration's inability to
solve problems as an outgrowth of a dysfunctional government,
or when the problems become too severe to overlook, people lose
faith in the system. 9 3 It is then that the threat of civil strife is
highest.'
President Menem was effective as a leader in stabilizing the economy by circumventing Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the provincial governments. In this respect, his policies have served to strengthen the nation. He must now, however, lead by working within a constitutional-democratic framework. 195

Second, coalition-building acts as a uniting force which
prevents ideological polarization and radicalization.'96 Open
lines of political discourse maintain this force as parties discuss
issues to reach workable solutions. 97 When Menem abused his
executive powers, his opponents took the semi-extreme measure

of temporarily shutting down the process of political discussion.
The real danger occurs when autocratic abuses by the President
push opposition groups into centrifugal competition'98 with the
incumbent party. Groups at the fringes of political activity see
no possibility of working within the system to effect change, and

191. See LINZ, supra note 179, at 20-23.
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. Recent uprisings in Mexico, for example, can be viewed as a rebellion
against what the poorer agricultural communities of the southern provinces consider
a dysfunctional government, unable and unwilling to deal with issues of poverty and
political disenfranchisement. See Victor Perera, Can Mexico's Ruling Political Party
Save the State, and Itself From Balkanization?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at M1;
Tim Golden, Mexico's Fine Line, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at A2.
195. See Garro, supra note 92, at 84. "Argentina's transition to a genuine democracy will continue to be impeded unless the executive is able to work out a political
arrangement with the legislative branch in search of broad-based support for policy
initiatives." Id. at 83-84.
196. Id. at 24.
197. See CALVERT & CALVERT, supra note 164, at 150-51; Cavarozzi, supra note
3, at 48.
198. See LINZ, supra note 179, at 27. By "centrifugal competition," Linz refers to
the radicalization of ideas to incorporate certain segments of society they feel will
give them support over the government. See id. The rise of the left and extreme
right fringe parties in the recent Constitutional elections may signify the beginning
of such competition. See generally Nash, supra note 82, at A5.

316

INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:2

resort to working against the government.' 9 9 Democracy, if it
can exist at all at this stage, is severely weakened.
The Menem-Alfonsfn coalition could have the positive effect
of bringing Argentina's two most important parties to agreement
on not only a common understanding of the other's objectives,
but also on a common path for reaching those objectives.2 °0
The Radicals have already proven that they are willing to sacrifice certain interests to maintain and improve the integrity of
the political system. Menem must also sacrifice when it comes
time to relinquish some of his presidential authority.2 0 1
VII. CONCLUSION

Argentina needs constitutional reform to repair government
institutions which have deteriorated over the one-hundred-fortyyear life of the present charter. In short, the executive branch
must be re-aligned in relation to the legislature, the judiciary,
and the provinces. The reform must place checks and balances
upon the President so that future leaders have a clear concept of
the limitations on their power. Restoring institutions to a condition where they promote democratic consolidation, however, is
only one element to this monumental project.
Argentine leaders and leaders throughout Latin America
have traditionally struggled with the fundamental principles of
democracy. The results, at times, have been disastrous.
Although the age of caudillos has long since passed, the attitudes adopted and developed in the early years of independence
continue to plague Argentina. Such perceptions of power are
incompatible with democracy in the twentieth century. The act
of reforming political institutions can only produce nominal

199. Id.
200. See Cavarozzi, supra note 3, at 47-48. In writing about the Alfonsin Administration, Cavarozzi noted, "[tihe governing party . . .will have to learn to recognize
the legitimacy of the opposition's criticisms, in order to avoid automatically attributing to them an eagerness to destroy democracy." Id. at 48.
201. Relinquishing power will also entail Menem addressing the charges of cor-

ruption within his government. Only by doing so will Menem assuage the concerns
of the Frente Grande and other members of the public that did not support Menem
or the Radicals in the Constitutional elections. See Results from Constituent Assembly
Elections, supra note 47. According to Mariano Grondona, a respected political commentator in Argentina, "[t]he vote for the Broad Front is a protest vote, a vote of
anger ...
."Id.
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change where politicians do not respect the rules placed upon
them. Only when the leaders have embraced the principles of
democracy, will the people follow.
From an economic perspective, President Menem has transformed Argentina over the past four years. The country's continued prosperity, however, depends heavily on its political stability. °2 Menem must now solidify the democratic foundation
on which Argentina's foreign trade and domestic economy can
flourish. The Constitutional Convention, to be held in the summer of 1994, will present an important opportunity for
Argentina to solidify that democratic foundation.
Menem may obtain his re-election amendment, but only at
the price of relinquishing some of his presidential power. Should
he not do so, the progress of democratic transformation in
Argentina will suffer. For a country with so much potential to
become a great economic power and political leader in Latin
America, such a result would be tragic. In contrast, achieving a
more democratic political system in Argentina by means of legal
constitutional reform will provide all of Latin America and other
developing regions with an example of reform and a reason for
hope.
Not only have Menem and Alfonsfn commenced the process
of institutional reform. They have demonstrated a change in
political attitudes. Argentine leaders must use this opportunity
to demonstrate that true, stable democracy is possible in Latin
America.
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